另外，Susan Greenhalgh“导弹科学，人口科学：中国一胎化政策的起源”（Missile Science, Population Science: The Origins of China’s One-Child Policy，The China Quarterly (2005), 182 : 253-276 Cambridge University Press）等文章有更详细的叙述：
Early on Song was singled out for praise and patronage by Qian Xuesen, the US-educated father of China’s space programme and top military science advisor to Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai.16 It was Qian who declared that it was Song, not he, who was the country’s leading control theory scientist. Qian showered the young Song with favoured opportunities for scientific advance. At Qian’s behest, Song was invited to head a new Control Theory Research Office in the Mathematics Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and chosen to co-author the revised edition of Qian’s two-volume Engineering Cybernetics, a bible for generations of Chinese defence scientists and engineers. Song’s abundant talent, technical accomplishments, and political patronage and savoir faire combined to propel him into the ranks of the topmost defence scientists and engineers. …
Building on personal ties forged in the defence science community, Song then began creating networks to deliver the proposal into the hands of the people who would matter. He created two chains of ties, one connecting him to top population policy makers, the other linking him to top political leaders.62 In the first, Song sent the group’s work to two of the nation’s top scientists, one natural and one social. Qian Xuesen (mentioned above) was one of the most influential natural scientists in the country, while Xu Dixin was one of China’s most eminent economists. Qian and Xu sent the materials on to Chen Muhua. Chen soon replied, writing that the projections were “very good” and “have great reference value” for policy-making, adding that she had “already prepared a special report for the Politburo.”63 In the second network, Song sent the materials to the secretary at the powerful National Defence Science Commission, who turned them over to Wang Zhen, vice-premier and member of the Politburo and Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission. Here Song seems to have been counting on his reputation as a leading missile expert, along with the prestige and political clout of defence scientists and policy-making bodies, to make his population policy the leading contender for adoption.
The strategy seems to have worked. In an interview, Song reported how Wang Zhen, upon receiving the research report, immediately picked up the phone and called to express his alarm.64 In his written reply, Wang endorsed the work as “extremely important” and suggested that it be made known to Chen Yun, second only to Deng in prestige and influence, and Hu Yaobang, secretary-general of the CCP.65 Many interviewees stressed that China’s top leaders were awestruck by the mathematics, shocked by the projections and convinced that a one-child policy was the only option. Song himself emphasized the fears those numbers created in the minds of China’s leaders. According to him, not only Wang Zhen but also Hu Qiaomu, Hu Yaobang and Hu Qili were shocked and persuaded by the report. Chen Muhua “decided on the one-child policy after reading the research report.”66 With only some exaggeration, another central actor maintained that “all the central leaders said the report was right.”67